Alignment Faking in Large Language Models

Greenblatt et al., 2024, Alignment Faking in Large Language Models (arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.14093)

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2 cards in “2.1 Key Elements” · whole deck

2.1 Key Elements

  1. How did Greenblatt et al. set up the conflict and let Claude 3 Opus tell training from deployment?
    It was told (fictionally) that it would be trained to be helpful-only, answering even harmful queries, or to dismiss animal welfare, both against its harmlessness training, and that only conversations with free-tier users are used for training. Each prompt marked the user as free or paid tier, so “free” implied training and “paid” implied unmonitored.
  2. Did Greenblatt et al. tell the model to fake alignment or give it a goal?
    No. The prompt never mentioned alignment faking or set an explicit goal; it only described the training situation. Any faking came from the model’s existing harmlessness preferences, which made the setup different from earlier demonstrations that gave models a goal.

Source

  • Ryan Greenblatt, Carson Denison, Benjamin Wright, Fabien Roger, Monte MacDiarmid, Sam Marks, Johannes Treutlein, Tim Belonax, Jack Chen, David Duvenaud, Akbir Khan, Julian Michael, Sören Mindermann, Ethan Perez, Linda Petrini, Jonathan Uesato, Jared Kaplan, Buck Shlegeris, Samuel R. Bowman and Evan Hubinger. 2024. Alignment Faking in Large Language Models. In arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.14093. https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.14093